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COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION AND THE KEWANEE
PREEMPTION ISSUE: IS THERE A DOCTRINE IN THE

HOUSE?
The Copyright Act of 1909 is one of a small group of hoary
federal statutes about which it can be said that the more
things change the more the law remains the same. Senate Bill
22, the proposed general revision of the United States copyright
law, I will effect sweeping reform of the federal system of copyright protection by abolishing the present duality of federal
statutory and state common law protection. 2 This reform will
1. "The purpose of the proposed legislation, as amended, is to provide in Title I
for a general revision of the United States Copyright Law, title 17 of the United States
" S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Code ....
THE REPORT]. The companion bill to S. 22 is H.R. 2223. Since the Senate passed S.
22 in February, 1976, (see note 19 infra) the question which remains is whether or not
the House will be able to integrate S. 22 into its own version of copyright revision (see
note 23 infra).
The author is indebted to Professor Paul Goldstein of the Stanford Law School
for his kind encouragement.
2. Federal protection is available for published works which have complied with
the statutory requirements of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970). Unpublished works are granted protection under section 2 of the Copyright Act. The touchstone of protection is the persistently troublesome concept known as "publication."
Generally, when compliance with statutory formalities has not been undertaken,
or has been faulty, publication serves to thrust a work into the public domain, and is
termed in such instances "divestiture publication." M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 46 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER]. When divestiture publication
occurs, all protection for a work is lost, since only unpublished works can be accorded
state protection and no federal protection is available where there is procedural noncompliance. Conversely, publication which is made after compliance with the Copyright Act is termed "investiture publication." Id.
One primary result of investiture publication is that the copyright exists only for
a limited time-at most two 28 year terms, under 17 U.S.C. § 24. This is in accord
with the constitutional mandate of the Copyright Clause (U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8) that
protection be secured for "limited Times." Common law copyright imposes no such

limitations of time. See B.

KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT

(1967); Chafee,

Reflections on the Law of Copyrights (pts. I-I), 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 719 (1945).
Tremendous controversy has raged however since the very first copyright statute
(8 Anne c. 19, (1710)) over what publication is and what it should be. Nimmer notes:
"The relevant decisions indicate that publication occurs when by consent of the copyright owner, the original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given
" NiMMER, supra § 49
away, or otherwise made available to the general public..
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Other commentators disagree with the
"tangible thing" test, and argue that a performance, in which a work is disseminated
but copies of it not received by the audience, should constitute publication. Kaplan,
Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L.
REV. 469 (1955); Selvin, Should Performance Dedicate?, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1954).
The effort in S. 22 to abolish common law copyright and rid the system of the
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be accomplished through section 301, one of the "bedrock"
provisions of the bill, which preempts all state rights equivalent to enumerated federal rights.' While section 301 certainly
was motivated by a need to end the present chaotic system,
arguably it also represents a legislative response to the constitutional dictates manifested in decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in the preemption area.'
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.' the Supreme Court
laid down a new test for preemption, declaring that state law
was preserved only if it neither conflicted with nor hampered
federal policy! The Court's decision in Kewanee momentarily
cleared water long made murky by its decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,' Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,

Inc.,' and Goldstein v. California.'

unworkable publication concept is a direct reflection of the controversy
above. THE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 113 states:
"Publication," perhaps the most important single concept under
the
present law, also represents its most serious defect. Although at one time,
when works were disseminated almost exclusively through printed copies,
"publication" could serve as a practical dividing
line between common
law and statutory protection, this is no longer true. With the development
of the 20th-century communications revolution, the concept of publication has become increasingly artificial and obscure. To cope with the legal
consequences of an established concept that has lost much of its meaning
and justification, the courts have given "publication" a number of diverse
interpretations, some of them radically different. Not unexpectedly,
the
results in individual cases have become unpredictable and often unfair.
A single federal system would help clear up this chaotic situation.
For commentary on an earlier congressional effort to eliminate publication
see
Cary, The Quiet Revolution in Copyright: The End of the "Publication"
Concept, 35
GEO. WASH.

3.

L.

REV.

652 (1967).

S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 provides in relevant part:
(a) On and after January 1, 1977, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship . . .
are
governed exclusively by this title.
THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 112-13, indicates: "Section
301, one of the bedrock
provisions of the bill, would accomplish a fundamental and significant
change in the
present law. . . .Common law copyright protection for works coming
within the scope
of the statute would be abrogated ....
"
4. "Its [section 301] purpose is to make clear, consistent with the
1963 [sic]
Supreme Court decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. .
. . and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. . . . that preemption does not extend
to causes of
action, or subject matter outside the scope of the revised Federal copyright
statute."
THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115. See also notes 5-9
and accompanying text infra.
5. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
6. Id. at 479.
7. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
8. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
9. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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This comment analyzes section 301 of Senate Bill 22, the
Sears-Compco doctrine, and the relationship between the test
for preemption established by section 301 and that established
by the Supreme Court. It proposes a method of analysis to
determine the constitutionality of the new act, and it is useful
because it suggests a method of predicting what state law will
be preempted by the proposed revision.
SENATE BILL

22: "THE BEDROCK PROVISION"

Legislative History
Copyright reform is hardly a new concept.'" Since its enactment in 1909, substantial efforts have been made to bring
the Copyright Act into conformity with a rapidly changing society. The first serious efforts toward a general revision began
in 1955 when reports on revision were solicited by Congress
from the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress." From
1955 to 1961, several studies were completed in accord with the
congressional request.I In 1964, following lengthy discussion on
the studies and the form of the revision bill, Senate Bill 3008
was introduced in the Congress.' 3 No action was taken on this
bill, and similar measures introduced in 1965, 1966, and 1967
encountered difficulties sufficient to prevent their passage.' 4
Although in 1967 the House passed H.R. 2512, a bill substantially similar to previous legislation, later substantive problems
interfered with the concurrence of both houses in legislative
attempts during the 1967-75 period.'" Primarily, Congress was
concerned with the issues of cable television (CATV), computer storage systems, sound recordings, and mechanical reprography systems.'"
10.

See

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE

COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,

STUDY No. 1 at 1 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter cited as THE STUDIES].

11.
12.

Id., Forword at lil.
Articles 1-34, in THE STUDIES, supra note 10, were completed in 1960, and in

1961 Congress received COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPY86th Cong.,
1st Sess., (1961). See also, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 1965 REVISION BILL, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
13. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
14. Id. at 47-48.
15. Id. at 48-49.
16. It can generally be said that these issues cause problems because their technological development is outside the original conceptual framework of the 1909 Copyright Act. See generally Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S.
RIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW,
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While some of these issues were resolved, by 1975 Congress
had yet to deal successfully with the computer and photocopying problem, and so established in the Library of Congress a
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works.'7 This commission was charged with the task of
advising the President on possible solutions to these persistent
problems. The report of the commission is due sometime in
1976.18
One might ask then, at the outset, what chance Senate Bill
22 has of passing in 197611 or 1977, and if it does pass, what its
form will be.
First, the bill probably will not pass until the Congress
receives the report of the commission.20 If, however, that report
is received in 1976 and provides a workable solution either
presently embodied in Senate Bill 22 or capable of being easily
added thereto, then the likelihood of prompt action is strong.
Senate Bill 22 is nearly identical to Senate Bill 1361, which the
Senate passed in 1974,21 and which may have been neglected
by the House primarily because not enough time was available
22

for consideration.

Whether or not Senate Bill 22 passes in 1976, or even in
1977, section 301 will almost certainly be included within the
bill in essentially its present form. Section 301 represents, in
its substitution of a single federal system for the present dual
system, a general agreement of legislators,23 and of the studies
390 (1968); Nimmer, New Technology and the Law of Copyright: Reprography and
Computers, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 931 (1968).
17. Pub. L. No. 93-573 § 201 (a), 88 Stat. 1873 (Dec. 31, 1974).
18. Id. at § 206 (a).
19. To a certain extent, any discussion of the enactment of S. 22, like any other
pending legislation, is merely speculative. Indeed, few legislative efforts have generated more talk and less action than the general revision of the copyright law. In spite
of this, some factors lend credence to the premise that S. 22 is on the verge of enactment. First, the United States Senate passed S. 22 on February 19, 1976. 122 CONG.
REc. 22 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1976). The Bill is now before the House of Representatives.
Second, the House must be cognizant of the pressing need for copyright reform. Third,
the House bill, H.R. 2223, is nearly identical to S. 22, and the inference can be made
that House passage will be the last hurdle, since few problems will probably remain
for both House and Senate concurrence.
20. The report of the commission is due sometime in 1976. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
21. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 49.
22. Id.
23. Section 301 of H.R. 2223 (the companion bill to S. 22) as set forth below
differs primarily in its greater clarity of language and in several substantive limits on
state remedies-notably that of misappropriation. Its thrust, to establish a single
federal system, is similar.
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and commentaries upon which they relied.24 The single federal
system would effectively carry out the constitutional mandate"
and at the same time terminate an intolerably chaotic system.
The desire for the single system and the realization by Congress
that section 301 offers a convenient means of implementing
that desire, assure it a place in future bills.
Breaking Apart the Bedrock: The Structure of Section 106
Although the thrust of section 3016 is clear-to preempt
(a) On and after January 1, 1977, all rights in the nature of copyright in works that come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to copyright, literary property rights, or
any equivalent legal or equitable right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any state.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any state with respect to:
(1) unpublished material that does not come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including
works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression;
(2) any cause of action arising from undertaking commenced before January 1, 1977;
(3) activities violating rights that are not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106, including breaches of contract, breaches of trust,
invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices
such as passing off and false representation.
H.R. 2223, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1975).
24. See THE STUDIES, supra note 10, STUDY No. 29, at 32-37; Finkelstein, The
Copyright Law-A Reappraisal, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1061 (1956). See generally,
THE STUDIES, supra note 10, STUDY No. 29, COMMENTS AND VIEWS SUBMITTED TO THE
COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON PROTECTION OF UNPUBLISHED WORKS, at 43-52.
25. "To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26. S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 provides in relevant part:
(a) On and after January 1, 1977, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in-works of authorship that are fixed
in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter
of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before
or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right
or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes
of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to:
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

common law protection and establish a single federal
scheme-the inconsistency of language in its provisions evidences that section 301 is attempting to perform two possibly
27
inconsistent tasks simultaneously.
For example, section 301(a) provides:
[N]o person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right [common law rights or their equivalent] in any such
work [published or unpublished] under the common law
or statutes of any state.
But section 301(b) provides:
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any states with respect to:
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are
not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106, including rights against misappropriation not equivalent to
any of such exclusive rights, breaches of contract, breaches
of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deception [sic] trade practices such as passing
off and false representation .... 25
Several observations can be made from parsing the language of the sections. First, preemption is made to depend
upon equivalency, a standard that is immensely difficult to
determine. Second, it is unclear upon what rationale the statute proceeds, affirmative ordering of a federal system or negative preemption of state rights. Notwithstanding the exactiof copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works
of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from an undertaking commenced
before January 1, 1977; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106, including rights against misappropriation not equivalent to any of such exclusive rights,
breaches of contract, breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deception [sic] trade practices
such as passing off and false representation; or
(4) sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972.
(c) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under any other Federal statute.
27. See note 26 supra. The argument could, of course, be made that preservation
and preemption are inseparable, but nevertheless, the clumsy drafting in 301 bears
criticizing.
28. S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301.
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tude with which the legislature has purported to express its
intent,"9 troubling inconsistencies persist both in the underlying structure and on the face of the statute.
Section 301 not only attempts to establish the single system and preemption notions, but also seeks to predicate them
on the Sears-Compco line of cases.
Its purpose is to make clear, consistent with the 1964 Supreme Court decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. that
preemption does not extend to causes of action, or subject
matter outside the scope of the revised Federal Copyright
Statute."
Thus, the structure of section 301 reveals at least two main
objectives: single system protection and preemption. In turn,
preemption is explicitly structured to accord with the decisions
of the Supreme Court.
The relation of publication to the present dual system has
been noted," but the structure of section 301 necessitates further discussion of the public domain issue involved therein. It
can generally be said that material for which no protection is
given, either federal or state, ends up in the public domain.
That is, the public has free access to, and use of, the material
in question. In addition, for purposes of the present discussion,
the public domain might be thought of as an area in which
works are placed before they are afforded protection.
Section 301 attempts to clarify the protection available for
various classes of material by explicitly delineating the standards necessary for protection. 2 Specifically, the single system
29. "The declaration of this principle [preemption] in section 301 is intended
to be stated in the clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose
any possible misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act
preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas between
State and Federal protection." THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 114.
30. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115 (citations omitted).
31. See note 2 supra.
32. Section 301 accomplishes this admirable goal in at least two ways. First,
greater protection is available because the instances of divestiture publication in which
a work is unwillingly thrust into the public domain will no longer plague the unwary
copyright holder; statutory protection adheres at the moment of creation. Thus, protection no longer depends on technical, vague, and inconsistent judicial doctrines, but
rather upon the explicit statutory language. This is particularly well illustrated when
the preemption and single system ideas in section 301 are compared with the notice
provisions in sections 401, 405, and 406 of S.22. The general effect of these provisions
is to require the familiar signals of copyright protection (i.e., section 401 (b) (1) re-
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rationale rids the copyright law of the "present anachronistic,
uncertain, impractical and highly complicated dual system." 3"
If, then, Senate Bill 22 attempts to establish the single
system, preempt any common law copyright not equivalent to
federal rights, and comport with the Supreme Court decisions,
the questions for analysis focus on the effectiveness of that
attempt. More narrowly, how effective is the preemption language, what state law is preserved (that is, what rights conferred by state law are not equivalent), and does the section 301
test meet the constitutional test established by the SearsCompco line of cases? In order to answer these questions, one
must first turn to the exclusive rights withheld by the federal
law, as set forth in section 106 of Senate Bill 22.
Support for the Bedrock: The Structure of Section 106
Section 106"4 plays a highly important role in Senate Bill
22 because when read with section 301, it provides the checklist
of exclusive rights. That is, section 301 states that rights equivquires the symbol ©D,
the word "copyright" or the abbreviation "copr."), but to lessen
the effect of their omission, with the result that protection is still accorded copies with
defective notice.
Second, sections 106-18 set forth the broad bundle of rights accorded the copyright owner and, more importantly, explicitly limit and narrow those rights in many
current problem areas. For example, sections 107-08 extensively codify and discuss
the perplexing problem of "fair use," and at least attempt thereby to eliminate some
of the confusion in that area. Of course, the codification of judicial principle does not
necessarily alleviate the difficulties of interpretation and application in any area of the
law, but the synthesis of conflicting rationales arguably produces a firmer base from
which to work.
33. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 113.
34. Section 106 provides in relevant part:
Subject to sections 107 through 117, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
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alent to the specified rights in section 106 are preempted.35 Of
paramount importance, then, are two considerations: what the
section 106 rights actually are, and to what rights they are
"equivalent."
Section 106 lists the "five fundamental rights that the bill
gives to copyright owners-the exclusive rights of reproduction,
adaptation, publication, performance and display."3 The legislative comment notes that the first three clauses of section
106 "can generally be characterized as rights of copying, recording, adaptation and publishing."3 7 Additionally, it explicates the remaining two sections in relevant part as follows:
[T]he right of public performance under section 106(4)
extends to "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works and sound recordings ....
Clause (5) of section 106 represents the first explicit statutory recognition in American Copyright Law of an exclusive right to show a copyrighted work, or an image of it, to
the public. 8
Further interpretation of the rights provided by section 106 is
supplied in the general definitional section of the act (section
101),11 and by the case law decisions in the various areas. 0
Assuming that a reasonably clear understanding of the 106
rights can be gleaned, there remains the question of what rights
are equivalent to those explicitly mentioned in the statute. The
answer to that question begins with an analysis of the decisions
of the Supreme Court in this area, continues with several possible tests for equivalency, and concludes with an examination
of the interplay among sections 301, 106, and the Supreme
Court decisions.
35. Section 301(a) states: "[A]IIl legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 . . . are governed exclusively by this title." S.22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(a)
(1974).
36. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 57.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 59.
39. Section 101 defines many of the terms and actions involved in the present
law and new act. Id. at 2.
40. The most comprehensive compilation of cases in virtually all areas of copyright law is found in NIMMER, supra note 2. This treatise supplies the major decisions
and provides a sophisticated, if occassionally controversial, explication of them.
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THE SUPREME COURT AND PREEMPTION: RECONCILING THE
IRRECONCILABLE

The Cases: Sears and Compco
In 1956 the Stiffel Company came upon the idea of a "pole
lamp," or free-standing lighting fixture gaining its support
from floor and ceiling and providing light at various points
along its length. America took pole lamps to its heart. Indeed,
their success was so great that Sears, Roebuck & Co. was inspired to bring their own similar version of pole lamps to homes
throughout the country. Since the Sears lamps were considerably less expensive than the innovative Stiffel lamps, Stiffel
brought suit, alleging that Sears had infringed its patent, or,
alternatively, had engaged in unfair competition under Illinois
law. " The district court invalidated Stiffel's patents for want
of invention,42 but nonetheless found Sears guilty of unfair
competition. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed," and the Supreme Court considered the question of
the co-extensivity of federal patent and state unfair competition law and reversed the court of appeals in Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co.45
Similarly, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. secured a patent in
1955 for its flourescent lighting fixtures, and subsequently
sought to enjoin Compco Corporation from manufacturing like
fixtures. Day-Brite based its claims on its patent and on unfair
competition, but in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
it succeeded only on the latter claim.4" The decision of the
Supreme Court in Compco, when read with its companion case
Sears, established what has generally become known as the
Sears-Compco preemption doctrine.
41. 376 U.S. 225, 225-26 (1964).
42. Invention, or as it is sometimes called, nonobviousness, is defined in 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1970):
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall
not be negatived by the manner in which invention was made.
43. 376 U.S. at 226.
44. 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
45. 376 U.S. 225 at 233.
46. 376 U.S. 234, at.234-36.
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The Sears-Compco doctrine mandates:
The patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the
same time preserving free competition. Obviously a State
could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, extend the life of a patent

. . .

on an article

which lacked the level of invention required for federal
patents. To do either would run counter to the policy of
Congress of granting patents only to true inventions, and
then only for a limited time. Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot,
under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the
objectives of the federal patent laws."1
The Sears-Compco doctrine, simply stated and as interpreted by the commentators, 8 is that state law may not protect
what is not protectable under the federal law, since this would
°
conflict with the federal purpose. 9 In Goldstein v. California,1
the court reconsidered this broad preemptive mandate."
The unauthorized or illegal duplication of tape recordings
and records had apparently provided a living for Mr. Goldstein,
until the state of California decided to prosecute him for violation of section 653h of the California Penal Code-the "tape
piracy" act.5" Relying, as well he might, on Sears and Compco,
47. 376 U.S. at 230-31 (footnotes omitted).
48. The commentary which followed the Sears-Compco decisions is extensive.
Professor Paul Goldstein has written what remain the most incisive commentaries in
this area. See Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L.
REV. 873 (1971), Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 49 (1969). See also Price, The Moral Judge and the CopyrightStatute:
The Problem of Stiffel and Compco, 14 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 90 (1966);
Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation"Distinction:A False Step in the Development
of the Sears-Compco Pre-Emption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (1971).
49. For a discussion of the constitutional considerations raised by preemption,
see note 137 infra.
50. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
51. The practical effects of Sears-Compco, particularly in the copyright area,
had less impact than was foreseen, especially by the critics of those decisions. On its
face, the Sears-Compcodoctrine could be read as preempting the vast majority of state
laws in the patents area, but the empirical evidence of the limits of the preemption
doctrine is the continued vitality of many state remedies.
52. Section 653h provides in relevant part:
(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:
(1) Knowingly and willfully transfers or causes to be transferred
any sounds recorded on a phonograph record, . . . tape . . . or
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Mr. Goldstein promptly argued that the California statute was
unconstitutional. 3 This argument was based on the allegation
that the California statute established copyright protection
(albeit extremely narrow) for an unlimited time, in direct contravention of the constitutional policy evident in the federal
statute." Additionally, it was argued that copyright functions
to establish a national standard, clearly expressed by the prohibition on copying those things explicitly protected by the federal scheme, the inference being that no such protection existed
for materials not explicitly mentioned, and that a state law
prohibiting copying of materials not mentioned by federal law
is conflicting.55 In short, Goldstein argued that materials not
protectable under the federal law could not be granted protection by the states.5"
The Supreme Court disagreed. 7 Premising its opinion first
on the issue of national interest," and second on the limited
time argument,59 the Court concluded that California retained
the power to issue copyrights." This conclusion then led to a
consideration of the claim that Sears and Compco patently
invalidated the California law. The Court finessed the problem
other article on which sounds are recorded, with intent to sell or
cause to be sold, .

.

. such article on which such sounds are so

transferred, without the consent of the owner.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 653h (West 1964).
53. 412 U.S. at 550. For a detailed analysis of the tape piracy industry, see Note,
Piracy on Records, 5 STAN. L. REV. 433 (1953).
54. Id. at 551. See note 2 supra.
55. Id. at 552.
56. Cf. 376 U.S. at 231.
57. 412 U.S. at 552.
58. Nimmer has criticized the conclusion reached by the Court that there is no
national interest powerful enough to preclude state protection. The argument that
such a national interest exists is premised upon the reality of a national, uniform,
market for items such as novels and motion pictures-a reality that the provincial ideal
of the Court ignores. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.1. It is interesting to note that the same
provincial yearning expressed in Goldstein was also expressed in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973), the obscenity case in which the "national contemporary community
standard" for obscenity was replaced by local standards, and which was decided
shortly before Goldstein.
59. The petitioners in Goldstein contended that California established a statelaw copyright of unlimited duration, in conflict with the Copyright Clause, (U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8). 412 U.S. at 551. The Court disposed of the argument by holding
that the constitutional mandate that protection be secured only for limited times was
applicable only to federal law, and that because state law would necessarily be effective only within the borders of the state, the effect of unlimited state protection was
justifiable both constitutionally and in practice. 412 U.S. at 560-61.
60. Id. at 561.

1976]

KEWANEE PREEMPTION

621

of distinguishing the Sears-Compco doctrine by holding that
the balance of interests necessitating exclusive federal control
in the patent area was inapplicable to sound recordings, and
by inference, to copyrights.'
If Goldstein weakened the preemptive mandate announced in Sears and Compco, 2 the latest judicial comment,
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 3 may have relegated it to the
64
intensive care ward.

Kewanee involved Ohio's trade secret laws.65 Kewanee's
Harshaw division developed over a period of some 17 years, a
process by which crystals were grown and used to detect ionizing radiation. 6 The development had been costly, and in an
effort to protect the process, Kewanee required its employees
to promise not to disclose the information. 7 The scent of more
exciting and possibly more lucrative rewards, however, lured
several Harshaw employees to form Bicron Corp. Bicron, organized to produce similar crystals, began production of them
61. The Court was faced with reconciling its decisions in Sears and Compco with
the direct attack made by the petitioner. The petitioner's argument was that SearsCompco conclusively prohibited state protection for items to which federal law did not
speak. Since sound recordings were not writings under 17 U.S.C. § 4, the petitioners
asserted that federal law did not protect such mechanical reproductions. 412 U.S. at
567-68.
The majority (Goldstein was decided 5-4, with Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Douglas and Marshall, dissenting) distinguished Sears-Compco on the basis that the
patent law, unlike its copyright counterpart, required uniform federal standards to
uphold a carefully balanced conflict of interests in order to further a competitive
rationale. Id. at 569. The copyright interest required no such balance; hence, no conflict between state and federal law arose. Id. at 570.
The dissent argued, inter alia, that Sears-Compco applied, and that to stimulate
competition, no state monopoly should be granted. Id. at 574 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. See generally Brown, Publicationand Preemption in Copyright Law: Elegiac
Reflections on Gdldstein v. California, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1022, 1025-31 (1974); B.C.
IND. & COMM. L. REv. 636, 639-54 (1974); 87 HARv. L. REV. 282, 286 (1974); 58 U. MINN.
L. REV. 316, 319-24 (1973); 19 VILL. L. REV. 496, 501-06 (1974).
63. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
64. A certain amount of disagreement about Kewanee's impact exists among the
commentators. One author has noted that Kewanee's effect has heretofore been "unheralded." Goldstein, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.:Notes on a Closing Circle, 1974
SuP. CT. REV. 81, 82 n.6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein, Kewanee Oil]. Nimmer
relegates Kewanee to footnote status. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.2 n.7.31-1. Nimmer
also notes, however, "Whatever vitality which might have remained in the Sears"
Compco doctrine . . . may well be completely obliterated by . . . Kewanee ....
Id. But see Stem, A Reexamination of Preemptionof State Trade Secret Law After
Kewanee, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 927 (1974).
65. Trade secret law is described more fully in text accompanying note 110 infra.
66. 416 U.S. at 473.
67. Id.
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seven months after its creation." Kewanee brought suit to enjoin and to recover damages for misappropriation of trade secrets." Kewanee prevailed in the district court,7' but the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that Ohio's trade secret
laws had been preempted, and reversed. 7' The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals.72
The importance of Kewanee is that the facts required the
Court directly to consider the Sears-Cormpco doctrine. Since
Goldstein dealt with copyright, the Court easily distinguished
Sears-Cornpco on the ground that patents and copyrights required a different balance of interests. In Kewanee, patent law
was involved, forcing the Court into a direct confrontation with
its earlier handiwork in Sears-Compco.73
The Court was faced with the task of identifying the
preemption policy objectives, noted in Goldstein74 and from
them, determining on a policy basis the conflicting interests.
The Court concluded:
Trade secret law and patent law have existed in this country for over one hundred years. Each has its own particular
role to play, and the operation of one does not take away
from the need for the other. Trade secret law encourages
the development and exploitation of those items of lesser
or different invention than might be accorded protection
under the patent laws, but which items still have an important part to play in the technological and scientific advancement of the nation. Trade secret law promotes the
sharing of knowledge, and the efficient operation of industry; it permits the individual inventor to reap the rewards
of his labor by contracting with a company large enough
to develop and exploit it."
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.at 474.
72. Id. at 493.
73. One fundamental difference existed between the materials in Kewanee and
those in Sears-Compco. In Kewanee, the crystals were patentable; that is, federal
protection was lost only on procedural grounds. In Sears-Compco, the materials failed
substantively. In Sears, the district court invalidated the patents for want of invention.
376 U.S. at 226. In Kewanee, the court of appeals found that the crystals were patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but that they had lost eligibility under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)
since they had been in commercial use for over one year. 416 U.S. at 474.
74. For example, in the copyright area, no preemption occurs unless conflict is
evident. 412 U.S. at 570.
75. 416 U.S. at 493.
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Thus, the Court viewed the preemption problem in policy
terms, decided that the policy of competition inherent in the
patent laws was enhanced, not abraded, by trade secret law
and that therefore no preemption existed. Mr. Justice Douglas
and Mr. Justice Brennan dissented" on the ground that the
constitution mandated that protection be secured to authors
and inventors only for limited times and that Ohio's trade secret law gave perpetual protection."
The Reconciliation: What Is Protectable?
The question remains, after the Kewanee decision, as to
what classes of intellectual property that have forfeited federal
protection are nevertheless protectable. Arguably, Kewanee
proceeded upon a policy basis, a standard perhaps more difficult to interpret than the more rigid formulations sometimes
utilized by the Court.78 The confusion engendered by SearsCompco, Goldstein and Kewanee requires a caveat in the nature of a disclaimer. It is too early, and the standards, policies,
and effects of these four cases are too complex, to speak with
any degree of certainty about their ultimate effect. At best, a
suggested reconciliation may be made, and guides may be offered for interpretation and easier determination of the occurrence of preemption.
One such interpretation and approach to preemption is
termed public domain analysis.7" There are of course other approaches: for example, the economic analysis promulgated by
one commentator, 0 or the more traditional inquiries into the
internal attempts at reconciliation and the statements of purpose in the cases themselves. s' Public domain, however, pro76. Id. at 495 (Douglas, J. dissenting, Brennan, J., concurring in the dissent).
77. This argument was also advanced by the petitioners in Goldstein. 412 U.S.
at 560-61.
78. At least nine rationales for preemption exist. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 286-89 (1975).
79. While public domain analysis has yet to be explicitly set forth by its author,
Professor Paul Goldstein of the Stanford Law School, it is implicit in his comments in
Goldstein, Kewanee Oil, supra note 64.
80. See Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L.
REV. 873 (1971).
81. The Court in Kewanee made an attempt, however unsuccessful, to reconcile
Sears-Compco. This was accomplished by reference to the discussion in Sears and
Compco of objectives: "However, as we have noted, if the scheme of protection developed by Ohio respecting trade secrets 'clashes with the objectives of federal patent
law,' . . . . then the state law must fall." 416 U.S. at 480. This represents a shift from
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vides a functional, applicable, and practical approach to the
difficult issues of what is protectable and what is preempted.
Public domain analysis is a useful analytical tool because
it shows that in the Sears-Compco line of cases, different
classes of materials were involved, and when properly utilized,
these different classes provide the key to protectability. Once
the various classes of materials are placed in the appropriate
public domain levels or areas, their protectable status can be
determined.
The public domain is that conceptual area in which inventions, books, forms, and other intellectual products are freely
available to the public. No protection, other than that accorded by contract between two parties," is possible. The public domain can also be thought of as an area in which materials
may be classified.
For purposes of this analysis, public domain has three
levels: upper, lower, and middle. The upper domain consists of
articles which fail to achieve statutory protection because of
procedural flaws. They are, in other words, capable of protection, but for want of compliance with a variety of procedural
requisites, have been denied protection."3
The lower domain includes articles which fail to achieve
protection because they cannot meet the substantive requirements of the federal law. 4 Also included in this area are materi
als which either by their "inherent" character or by public
policy are denied the protection accorded by federal law."5 Expreemption assumed (as in Sears) to preemption conditionally dependent upon conflicting objectives (Kewanee), without any reconciliation of the two views. A reconciliation is necessary because Sears did not depend upon the objectives argument for its
preemptive holding.
82. Such contractual arrangements were present in Kewanee. 416 U.S. at 473.
83. Thus, material which, as in Kewanee, could have been patented but which
has entered the public domain through purely procedural means, exists in the upper
domain. See 416 U.S. at 473. In the copyright area, material which has defective notice
(i.e., which fails to comply with section 19 of the Copyright Act) would also be upper
domain material. But see text accompanying note 102 infra.
84. For example, the material in Sears and Compco.
85. Various classes of occurrences illustrate such material. However, a distinction must be made between the facts (the actual event-for example, the resignation
of Richard Nixon), data (a record or notation of the event by others), and information
(an individual's treatment or interpretation of the data and event) to ascertain what
is protectable. The first two may not be; the last most certainly is. See Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879). See also 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970); Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1006-09 (1970). But cf. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (copyright of citizen's film of assassination of President John F. Kennedy).
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amples of these sorts of materials include obscene or libelous
works," ideas, colors, musical notes, and conversations. 7
In terms of policy, those objects in the upper domain are
accorded protection because the Congress has determined that
incentives should be offered to promote their creation and development. Material in the lower domain can only achieve protection if the policy interests shift, and it is determined that
protection-and thus incentive for development-is appropriate."
The middle domain covers materials which fail neither
procedurally nor substantively, but rather, to which the federal
statute does not speak at all. Depending on the class of material involved in this middle domain, a shift into either the
upper or lower domains may take place, and protection will
vary accordingly.
What correlation is there between the Sears-Compco line
of cases and the public domain? First, Sears and Compco concerned material in the lower domain-objects that were not
protectable (in this case, patentable) because they failed to
meet substantive requirements." Kewanee dealt with material
in the upper domain; that is, the crystals involved were clearly
patentable, but lost statutory protection because they had
been in use for one year.9 " Goldstein occupies the middle
ground, since the sound recordings with which it dealt were
not covered by federal copyright law at that time."
As will be shown, the placement of materials affects protectability. The public domain analysis briefly introduced
above also assists in reconciling the cases mentioned, and delineates more clearly the protection accorded by federal and
state law.
86. See Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903); 41 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 395
(1958); NIMMER, supra note 2, § 36.
87. Some doubt exists on the conversation issue. At least one court has discussed
the issue of common law copyright for conversations, and has stated in dicta that such
a copyright could in limited circumstances be recognized. Estate of Hemingway v.
Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968). See Note,
Copyright: Right to Common Law Copyright in Conversationof a Decedent, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 366 (1967).
88. An example is the conversation issue. See note 87 supra. If conversations were
accorded protection, their status would shift upward.
89. 376 U.S. at 226.
90. 416 U.S. at 474.
91. 412 U.S. at 551-52.
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Applying the Public Domain Analysis: State Protection of the
Copyright Interest
At the outset, an analysis predicated upon the position of
a work within the various domain levels serves a useful if not
obvious function-it eliminates chaos to a large extent.2 Public
domain analysis provides, in its refined form, a method of accurately predicting what interests remain protectable under
state law after Kewanee. It additionally provides a method of
determining to a more exact degree the scope of state protection under section 301.11 The literal effect of Sears-Compco
would have been to preempt all state protection when federal
law also applies.94 This frightening possibility95 obviously necessitates a method of interpretation sufficiently precise as to
indicate accurately the state law which is still viable.
Public domain analysis operates by first classifying material into the various levels," 8 and from those classifications,
determining policy support for protection or non-protection.
Initially, before applying the analysis to the cases, it becomes apparent that Goldstein is inherently predictive. Since
Goldstein was a copyright case and involved material in the
middle domain,97 its predictive effect is this: those items or
92. "[P]reemption is very much ad hoc decision-making. Each case tends to
turn on its own facts and precedent tends to be of minimal value.
J. BARRON &
C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 289 (1975).
93. Arguably, the tests for preservation of state law under Kewanee and under
section 301 differ. See text accompanying note 140 infra.
94. 376 U.S. at 231.
95. But see note 51 supra.
96. A Public Domain matrix would thus appear:
UPPER DOMAIN
Material which enters public domain
through procedural non-compliance
MIDDLE DOMAIN

(copyrightable and patentable material).

That material to
which statute
does not speak.

LOWER DOMAIN
Material which enters public domain
through its character, or by public policy (obscene, libelous, ideas, colors,
words, musical notes, forms, conversations). Material which fails substantively for federal protection.

97.

412 U.S. at 551-52.
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activities to which the federal law does not speak will, under
Goldstein, be fully capable of state protection, unless they conflict with the additional standards imposed by Kewanee, as
discussed below.9" Thus, all middle domain material (note that
lower domain material, which fails substantively, would not be
accorded federal protection regardless of whether the federal
statute referred to it) achieves state protection, within the
Kewanee limits.
The predictive effect of Sears and Compco, which dealt
with materials in the lower domain, differs. Basically, if an
item can be placed in the lower domain, it necessarily cannot
be protected by the states.9 That is, items which fail to qualify
for federal protection because they fail substantively and thus
fall into the lower domain could not receive state protection,
since this is clearly contrary to the federal policy.
In a sense, the prediction of protectability is complete
upon classification. 0 Once an item is classified in accord with
the Sears-Compco, Goldstein and Kewanee decisions, its status is clear. That which occupies the upper domain is protectable, and that which is placed in the lower domain loses all
protection. Two major problems, however, still exist. One is
that even though an item may be protectable, a question re98. See text accompanying note 100 infra. Note that Goldstein is inherently
predictive because it deals with the balance of interests in the copyright area.
Goldstein does not stand for the proposition that any lacunae in statutory coverage
imply preservation of state law in other areas.
99. Placement in the lower domain implies conflict; conflict in turn implies
preemption.
100. Perhaps classification pins down many of the problems in this area with
which Professor Nimmer wrestles. Nimmer asks:
Is a work of a kind enumerated in Section 5 of the Copyright Act which
fails of federal protection because it lacks originality or because there has
been a failure to observe one of the required formalities such as notice,
or manufacture, thus excluded from the federal sphere and therefore not
preempted from state law protection? Is a work which has qualified for
statutory copyright protection under the federal law, but which then loses
such protection upon the expiration of the statutory term, thereafter once
again eligible for state law protection?
NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.2 (footnotes omitted).
Classification by public domain levels may provide answers. First, works which
fail procedurally clearly fit within the upper domain and are thus protectable under
state law. Note that this advances the federal policy: since state protection can still
be accorded, the federal policy of some protection is furthered.
Similarly, material which formerly qualified, but no longer qualifies for federal
protection falls swiftly into the depths of the lower domain. This material is no longer
capable of meeting substantive requirements, and therefore must lose all protection-state and federal.
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mains as to what law protects it-state or federal. The other is
that Kewanee produces an interesting anomaly when subjected
to public domain analysis, and this result must be reconciled.
Kewanee, as we have noted, deals with material in the
upper domain, where statutory protection is lost through procedural defects. Presumably then, the state law protection for
such material would be preserved, and indeed, in the patent
area, that is the effect. 0' But, when Kewanee is used to predict
the preemption of state law in the copyright area, the preemptive test appears to fail.
This result occurs because if protection for works copyrightable but for procedural defects were available under state
law (through Kewanee) federal policy would be contraverted.
This effect is caused in turn by the federal law's imposition of
procedural requirements which have a substantive effect. That
is, the notice provisions (the procedural requirement most
often causing divestiture publication) are substantive in that
they promote a necessary federal policy, that of providing notice to the public of the status of a work.' 2
The effect is perhaps simpler than the cause- protection
is given for works in violation of a federal policy. If this were
allowed, still another federal policy, that of providing an
incentive to seek protection under the federal scheme, is destroyed, because the state law would provide protection for an
unlimited time regardless of the federal constitutional stricture. 103

The solution lies in an understanding of Kewanee's subtle
effects. Substantively, Kewanee speaks to the material with
which it deals in two major ways. First, it imposes a "necessary" requirement which dictates that for the states to protect,
the material must be in the upper public domain. Second, and
of paramount importance, Kewanee mandates a "sufficient"
requirement: the state protection must necessarily further the
101. The patent interest requires that federal and state law further the competition and incentives inherent in limited monopolies of the patent type. Therefore, only
those materials which fail procedurally can be accorded state protection, because to
afford state protection to substantively unqualified materials would allow state law to
provide an incentive for the development of works not favored by federal law.
102. See THE STUDIES, supra note 10, STUDY No. 7, at 46-47.
103. This, of course, is the by-now-familiar argument advanced by the petitioners in Goldstein. 412 U.S. at 560-61.
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federal policy.' 4 The two requirements are to be read conjunctively. 105
Thus, Kewanee accurately predicts the preservation of
state copyright law only upon an application of its functional
test: to avoid preemption, the state law at issue must be necessary and sufficient. Application of the functional test provides
an answer to both of the remaining difficulties noted above. It
rids Kewanee of its anomalous result, and provides, as the
following specific instances will show, a method for predicting
what law applies.
The Question Answered: State Law Meeting Kewanee's
Functional Test Is Preserved
The conclusion that Kewanee's test provides the key to
determining preemption is predicated in large measure upon
the additional observation that Kewanee represents the most
comprehensive judicial resolution of the preemption issue.
Kewanee cites, relies upon, and occasionally distinguishes the
previous cases, 10 and can fairly be said to represent the broadest sweep of the judicial brush on the preemption landscape.
One way of showing Kewanee's predictive effect is to determine if existing state law meets the requirements of its functional test.'" 7 Of the existing state remedies," 8 including the
104. 416 U.S. at 479.
105. Inferentially, since Kewanee differs considerably from the only other decisions in this area, Sears and Compco, its holding depends, first, upon patentability
(upper domain material) and, second, upon furtherance. As so restated, its holding
might read: "When patentable material is in question, the state law must further the
federal statute."
106. 416 U.S. at 479-83.
107. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
108. Copyright protection in California is provided by CAL. Civ. CODE § 980
(West 1964). Specific rights recognized under this section include, for example, the
right to first publication, Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542
(1969); protection for the expression of ideas, Ware v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 253 Cal. App. 2d 489, 61 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1967); right to contract in the realm of
ideas, Davies v. Krasna, 245 Cal. App. 2d 535, 54 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1966).
When public domain analysis is applied to section 980, the California law remains
partly viable. From the previous discussion (see text accompanying note 100 supra)
we know that only materials in the upper domain will retain protection, because only
they can pass muster under the Kewanee test. Accordingly, section 980(a) remains
viable for those materials which fail procedurally, but not for materials which fail
substantively. Thus, obscene or libelous material could not gain the benefits of section
980 protection since it fails substantively to meet the requirements of the Copyright
Act. The public policy against granting incentives for such works is advanced, conflict
is avoided, and state law is preserved. Section 980(b) functions similarly; that is, those
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imaginative new tort remedies which constantly develop,' °9 the
following four remedies of misappropriation, trade secret law,
unfair competition law, and common law copyright are the
most important. A brief description of each, and a review under

the functional test will reveal the status of the remedy.

Trade secrets"0 provide a beginning for analysis of state
protection, since they play such a highly important role in
commercial competition. Professor Goldstein notes that trade
secrets
generally fall into two categories, property and confidential relationship. Rights under the property rubric are
effective as against the world at large. Rights under the
confidential relationship rubric are effective against only
a limited range of persons-those to whom the secret has
been disclosed in confidence.''
Trade secrets present a particularly difficult analytical
problem, because the nature of protection is so ephermeral,"2
and because the class of protectable items defies facile "pigeonholing.""' 3 As a generalization, the Kewanee test applies in the
following manner. First, the state law must be both necessary
and sufficient. That is, the materials in question must be in the
upper domain, or not spoken to by statute and thus covered by
materials which under the patent interest are in the upper domain remain protectable
by the state law.
109. As discussed in the text accompanying note 128 infra, the language of section 301 is somewhat vague and certainly broad. This can perhaps best be construed
as a deliberate effort on the part of the legislature to allow for the development of new
tort remedies. That is, if the statute had more explicitly set forth the state law remedies preempted, a strong argument could be made that any remedies not listed were
thus not preempted. The broad language of section 301 may be a deliberate attempt
to avoid such a result.
110. A trade secret is defined by the Restatement of Torts as "[a]ny formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it ....
" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment (b).
On trade secrets generally, see R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS, (1953); A. TURNER, THE
LAW OF TRADE SECRETS, (1962); Ladas, Legal Protection of Know-How, 54 TRADEMARK
REP. 160 (1964).
111.

P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE Doc-

TRINES, CASES & MATERIALS, 165 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN TEXT]; see
Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 22 (1962) (other causes and theories)
[hereinafter cited as Stedman]. See also Conmar Prod. v. Universal Slide Fastener
Co., 172 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1949) (property-confidence distinction explicated).
112. Stedman, supra note 111, at 5.
113. But categorization is the sine qua non of public domain analysis. Conclusive
resolution may depend upon case-by-case analyses of the secrets in question.
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Goldstein."4 Only upper domain material, or middle domain
material not barred by federal policy is protectable, since only
this material will satisfy the sufficiency requirement, and further federal policy. Second, state law which meets both requirements of the functional test is preserved, but only to the
extent that it speaks to upper domain material. By definition,
state protection accorded to lower domain material cannot
meet the functional test and must be preempted.
This is perhaps more clearly illustrated by consideration
of the misappropriation remedy."' Misappropriation deals with
two main areas: trade secrets and materials for which common
law copyright is available. In the copyright area, misappropriation is an explicit effort to circumvent the effect of SearsCompco by substituting an "appropriation" theory for the
"copying" theory discussed in those cases." 6 In the trade secret
and unfair competition areas misappropriation generally refers
to the taking of another's product, name or reputation, and
representing them as one's own." 7
Misappropriation presents a difficult public domain
analysis problem because the rights it encompasses are broad
and it functions in an extremely diverse manner.I" Preemption
is likely, however, for two reasons. First, misappropriation sub9
stitutes in many cases for common law copyright," and thus
2
provides protection for an unlimited time. " Second, misappro114. State protection for middle domain material is only preempted if that material shifts to lower domain status. Therefore, when middle domain material is in
question, the current policy regarding the exact material in question must be examined. If under current policy that material could assume upper domain status, no
preemption occurs. But, if the material could shift to lower domain status, the state
law protecting it must be preempted.
115. Initially, a distinction must be made between the misappropriation applicable to common law copyright and that used in unfair competition. Unfair competition
merely uses misappropriation as an element for its actionability, while common law
copyright relies upon it as prima facie violation of the copyright holder's interest.
116. Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation"Distinction: A False Step in the
Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-Emption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444
(1971).
117. GOLDSTEIN TEXT, supra note 111, at 89-90. See Chafee, Unfair Competition,
53 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1940).
118. See authorities cited notes 116 & 117 supra.
119. Goldstein notes, "[o]f all of unfair competition's tenets, misappropriation
was the most likely candidate for preemption: its extensive monopoly is often used as
a surrogate for copyright or patent protection in situations in which, for one reason or
another, the federal laws withhold protection." GOLDSTEIN TEXT, supra note 111, at
147.
120. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d
Cir. 1955) (Judge Learned Hand, dissenting).
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priation makes no distinction between the classes of materials
it seeks to protect. Therefore, if lower domain material is protectable by state misappropriation law, the necessary requirement of Kewanee's functional test is not met, and preemption
occurs. The conclusion can be made that preemption of misappropriation law depends upon case-by-case determination of
compliance with the Kewanee functional test.
Surprisingly, even though misappropriation allows
protection for an unlimited duration, and fails to distinguish
between classes of materials, Senate Bill 22 explicitly preserves
it."'1 To the extent, however, that misappropriation protects
lower domain works, that part of Senate Bill 22 preserving state
misappropriation law may be unconstitutional. At the least,
preemption will occur in spite of the explicit preservation of the
state law.
To discuss unfair competition after describing trade secrets and misappropriation is to consider genus after species,
and many similar arguments apply. In California, for example,
at least some of the law of unfair competition is codified."
Under the law of California, unfair competition means and
includes unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair,
untrue, or misleading advertising and any act denounced
by [Business and Professions Code sections] 17500-17502,
17530, 17531.123

Unfair business practices presumably include the theft of trade
secrets, or misappropriation.
Unfair competition as a genre must be subjected to much
the same public domain analysis as that described for other
state remedies, because it involves materials in all parts of the
domain. Placement of materials iA their proper domain area,
and determination of the "necessary and sufficient" requirements will reveal the preemptive status of the state law. For
example, if unfair competition prevents false or misleading
advertising,'24 we know that such statements can be placed in
the lower public domain, since public policy is against providing such material with a copyright incentive. Thus, since such
121. Section 301(b) (3) preserves "rights against misappropriation not equivalent to any of such exclusive rights..." in the federal statute.
122. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17000 et seq. (West 1964); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3369
(West 1964).
123. Reachi v. Edmond, 277 F.2d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 1960).
124. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1964).
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material is incapable of protection, any state law which did
protect it would conflict and so be preempted. Here, state law
denies protection, and indeed protects against such material,
and the result is state and federal harmony.
Common law copyright is the last of the state remedies to
25 Section 301(a) explicitly preempts common
considered.'
be
law copyright, 26 but limits its preemption to equivalent rights
under the federal statute.'27 Therefore, we are again faced with
the dual problems of determining what rights constitute common law copyright, and whether those rights are equivalent to
federal rights.
Perhaps the speediest preemptive determination can be
made by comparing material sought to be protected by common law copyright'28 with the protection afforded by section
106.129 For example, common law copyright can protect works
' 30
which fail under federal law because they are not "writings.'
Public domain analysis places such material in the middle
domain (since the statute does not speak) and indicates that
state protection depends upon current policy. Therefore, to the
extent that common law copyright attempts to protect nonwritings, preemption occurs only when middle domain material shifts to lower domain status.
Common law copyright might preclude the defense of fair
use.' 3' Since section 107 of Senate Bill 22 explicitly limits the
actionable rights in section 106 by codifying the fair use defense, common law copyright directly conflicts and is thus
preempted. In the area of rights, as opposed to classes of materials, the "necessary and sufficient" requirements themselves,
rather than the public domain analysis, accurately predict
125. Nimmer notes that common law copyright protects "against unauthorized
copying, publishing, vending, performing, and recording. In some respects common
law copyright accords rights which are broader than those available under statutory
copyright." NIMMER, supra note 2, § 111 (footnotes omitted).
126. Section 301(a) provides in part: "[N]o person is entitled to any such right
or equivalent right under the common law or statutes of any state." S.22, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 301.
127. Id.
128. Common law copyright protects a broader class of materials; for example,
works that are not "writings" under the federal statute are protected. NIMMER, supra
note 2, at § 111. Similarly, some rights are expanded: common law rights are absolute,
id.; fair use is not available as a defense, id. at n.453; and the requirements of tangibility and intelligibility are lessened, id.
129. See note 34 supra.
130. See note 25 supra.
131. Id. See also NIMMER, supra note 2, § 145.
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preemption. In this case, preemption is assured because the
state law attempt to eliminate fair use fails to meet the "sufficient" requirement in that it does not further federal policy.
Thus, a method for predicting preemption of state laws
emerges by considering both the placement of intellectual
property and Kewanee's functional test. It becomes necessary
to determine in each case the class and rights involved, but the
predictive effect remains constant.
INTERPLAY: KEWANEE'S FUNCTIONAL TEST AND SECTION

301

JUXTAPOSED

The Statutory Ambiguities
The effects of the functional test are fairly certain, as
shown by the preceding analysis of the four state remedies.
Kewanee, however, is not the only player in the game-section
301 establishes its own test for preemption."'3 In order to determine which test best promotes copyright policy, or more basically, which is constitutional, a comparison of the two tests is
required.
An initial difficulty encountered in juxtaposing Kewanee
and section 301 is that the language of section 301 remains
somewhat ambiguous. As a brief review of the first section of
this comment indicates, the statute attempts concomitantly to
preserve and preempt in language open to many possible interpretations.'3 3 The question is, then, will a comparison of the
test established by the language of section 301 and the
Kewanee test support a conclusion that the two tests are coextensive?
The argument for co-extensiveness rests upon two main
points: the legislative history, and the actual effect of the
section 301 test. The legislative history and commentary
clearly support the assertion that Congress was at least attempting to adopt the Kewanee test. The Senate report noted:
[The] purpose [of section 301] is to make clear, consistent with the 1964 Supreme Court decision in Sears...
and Compco . . . that preemption does not extend to
causes of action, or subject matter outside the scope of the
revised Federal Copyright Statute.'
132.
supra.
133.
134.

Section 301 preempts all rights equivalent to statutory rights. See
note 26
See text accompanying note 27 supra.
THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115.

1976]

KEWANEE PREEMPTION

By inference, the Kewanee test may be substituted for the
Sears-Compco decisions, because it is evident that the
legislature had the judicial constraints in mind when drafting
the statute, and Kewanee is the clearest expression of those
constraints.'3 5
The actual effect of section 301 also supports its coextensiveness with Kewanee. When a comparison is made between what protection is left using the section 301 test, and
what is left after the Kewanee functional test, the result is that
much the same state protection is preserved. Thus, the analysis
of state law in the preceding section indicates that the common
law rights preserved by Kewanee are also preserved by section
301.136

Notwithstanding the attempt by the Congress to codify
the Kewanee test, and the apparent effectiveness of that attempt, colorable arguments can still be made that the section
301 test fails to embody the Kewanee test. If this were indeed
the case, section 301 would be open to constitutional chalconfusion about the status of state law
lenge' 37 and further
38
would result.'
The first argument that the tests are not co-extensive is
135. Kewanee extensively refers to Sears-Compco and Goldstein, and in its consideration of those cases assimilates and synthesizes their conceptual frameworks. 416
U.S. at 478-83.
136. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
137. A constitutional challenge would be based upon the theory that, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Copyright Clause requires co-extensive state law to
neither conflict with nor hamper federal policy.
It is interesting to note that only tentative conceptual challenges have been made
regarding the constitutionality of copyright itself. Predicated upon conflict with the
first amendment, these challenges assert that copyright may restrain freedom of expression.
The problem in copyright, as in other first amendment issues, is to strike the
proper definitional balance. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912-14 (1963). Nimmer accepts that such a balance is
possible, and that the greatest problem rests in determining what interests to weigh,
and how to weigh them. NIMMER, supra note 2, at §§ 9.2, 9.21. Whatever the resolution
of the problem, it has been suggested that more consideration is presently due first
amendment challenges than has been accorded in the past. See Sobel, Copyright and
the First Amendment: A GatheringStorm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 43
(1971).
On the general relationship of copyright and the first amendment, see Chafee,
Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1945); Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970).
138. Section 301 alone fails to provide adequate guidance to determine preemption. On its face it preserves those state rights not equivalent to the section 106 rights,
but problems immediately develop in determining equivalency in that section.
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that they are not identical in form. Section 301 preserves that
state law which does not conflict with explicit federal protection.'39 Possibly inherent within that definition is the idea that
preserved state law should further federal policy, but such a
requirement is not explicit. Kewanee, on the other hand, expressly requires that state law further the federal purpose. 40
The importance of these semantic distinctions is that two
distinct standards are established, or at least the possibility of
two standards. Either way, a problem of interpretation is posed
for the courts. Obviously, it is beneficial for statutes to eliminate rather than create such difficulties.
The second, and related argument asserts that the tests
differ not only in form, but also in substance. The statutory test
deals only with upper domain material (for which protection is
necessary), and not with material which may be protected
without damaging federal policy (sufficiency). Thus, in substance, the 301 test could permit state protection which does
not further federal policy, as is required by Kewanee. This
conclusion is premised upon the assumption that section 301
does not require the courts to apply the sufficiency requirement, but merely to review section 106, and if the state right
is excluded from the bundle of rights preserved by that section,
the state remedy is preserved. This flaw, if actually present and
operative to the full extent described, prima facie invalidates
the section 301 test.
Although the form and substance of section 301 could be
interpreted to avoid the Kewanee precepts, a functional view
of sections 301 and 106 reveals that their effect is to codify the
Kewanee test. First, section 106 lists almost all rights and actions.' Second, the most objectionable (potentially conflicting) state remedy-common law copyright-is explicitly
preempted.'4 2 Third, the remaining state remedies are generally viable under the Kewanee test.'
The effect is that only those state remedies are specified
139.

THE REPORT,

supra note 1, at 114.

140. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
141. That is, the section 106 list of rights in effect denies remedies which
conflict
with federal law, because its listing substitutes federal remedies
for state remedies.
Federal policy is furthered because that which is within the federal
statute (nearly all
remedies) must necessarily further the federal policy.
142. Preservation occurs only to the extent that rights granted under
common
law copyright meet Kewanee's functional test.
143. See text accomparying note 104 supra.
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and preserved that actually serve to further the federal policy.
The constitutional mandates are furthered, 44' and the objection
that some state law creates monopolies of unlimited duration
is overcome, because if those monopolies do exist, they must
nonetheless further the federal purpose, as determined by the
Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

This comment has analyzed the issue of the preemption of
state law in the copyright area as affected by the proposed
copyright revision bill. It has been suggested that a "public
domain analysis" can be used first to demonstrate that the
proposed statute is in harmony with recent Supreme Court
cases on preemption in this area, and second to predict which
state laws will escape the preemptive sweep of the federal statute. Two general conclusions can be drawn.
While poorly drafted-that is, fraught with ambiguities
and dual purposes-the statute still successfully codifies the
constitutional mandate in the copyright area as interpreted by
the Supreme Court. The statute establishes a reasonably workable standard for judicial determination of preemption.
The convoluted, complex, and confusing line of cases discussed may well have been the only practical solution to a
thorny problem, particularly in view of the lack of legislative
guidance. A jurisprudential perspective reveals that SearsCompco and its aftermath represent an attempt by the judiciary to fill legislative gaps and provide practical interim standards. 45
Robert Steven Mann
144. Effectively, any state law which does not meet the section 106 test (the
union of the section 301, 106 and Kewanee functional tests) will not be preserved.
Thus, under the "106 test," those classes of intellectual property which fail under
either public domain analysis or Kewanee analysis are denied all protection.
145. This comment was awarded first prize in the Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition at the University of Santa Clara School of Law.

